Design the Site for Deterrence, Clean Sightlines, and Fast Handoff to Forensics

Contributed by Jim Brigham, LCG VP of Risk Management, Former Operations Chief, State of Vermont, Office of Safety & Security

Series context. This five-part series translates lessons from the Utah Valley University incident into practical guidance for campuses, event organizers, and public officials. Part 4 focuses on venue design and event operations that deter, deny, and speed response without ruining the attendee experience. [1]

The Design Problem in Plain Terms

Outdoor venues create long exposed sightlines, elevated vantage risk, and crowd egress friction. Your goal is not to militarize the space. Your goal is to reduce attacker advantages, shorten decision time, and keep routes clear for medical and investigative teams. Proven playbooks from major-event guidance, building risk manuals, and crowd safety standards give you a disciplined starting point. [2][3][4][5][8]

LCG perspective. Security that is invisible to attendees is visible to attackers. Build deterrence into backdrops and staging, control rooftops and windows, and rehearse the first hour so the cordon and evidence handoff happen fast. [2][3][4]

A Venue Overlay that Works at Human Scale

• Own the elevated vantage points. Sweep and control rooftops, windows, ladders, catwalks, scaffold, and camera towers. Use access logs and posted posts, not just walk-throughs, and coordinate with property owners in writing. [2][3]
• Design the stage to deny lines of fire. Use backdrops and set pieces with ballistic or backstopping properties where feasible, minimize long axial sightlines, and avoid tunnel-like aisles that trap crowds. Align with FEMA risk design guidance. [8][12]
• Engineer crowd flow. Place barriers to steer arcs around chokepoints, pre-mark emergency egress, and assign trained crowd managers per Life Safety Code practice. Put shelter-in-place and evacuation messaging on screens and PA scripts. [5]
• Pre-stage overwatch that doubles as comms. Camera towers and lighting masts should have defined observation roles and dedicated radio channels, not just production uses. Use a single incident command net across security, medical, and operations. [3][4]
• Practice the cordon–forensics handoff. In the first minutes, lock the perimeter, freeze cameras, preserve witness-video intake, and route lanes for EMS. Use a preapproved evidence matrix so field staff do not improvise. [3][4]

Map Your Plan to Standards, Lessons, and Pitfalls

Standards to anchor decisions. Use the DOJ COPS major-events guide for preplans and interagency roles, BJA’s large-event primer for operations, CISA’s venue guide for practical mitigations, NFPA crowd-manager practices for staffed egress, and FEMA risk steps for sightline and standoff choices. [2][3][4][5][12]

Executive-protection interface. When principals attend, align your site overlay with the ASIS Executive Protection standard, so protective details can plug in without re-writing your plan on show day. [10]

Comparative lessons. Historic after-actions and recent European incidents underscore the basics: control elevated positions, define approaches, and maintain clear post-incident lanes. Themes recur from the Warren Commission’s building-inspection emphasis to modern attacks where unmanaged perimeters created confusion. [9][11][12]

Pitfalls to avoid.

• Cosmetic barriers that do not change behavior or lines of fire.
• Unstaffed “open” rooftops or windows that were “not our property.”
• Production-owned towers without assigned overwatch responsibility.
• Crowd staff without NFPA-aligned training, which creates egress delays. [5]

Recent Incidents, with the Same Geometry of Risk. Facility Types Differ; the Fundamentals Do Not.

• Grand Blanc Township, MI (Sept. 28, 2025): Attack at a Latter-day Saints meetinghouse involved vehicle ramming, gunfire, and an arson fire. Clear sightlines and rapid cordon matter when threats escalate across modes. [13]
• Annunciation Catholic Church & School, Minneapolis (Aug. 27, 2025): A shooter fired into a school Mass, killing two children and injuring many parishioners. Dual-use sites blur “school” and “event” security. [14]
• Cristo Rey Jesuit High School, Minneapolis (Aug. 26, 2025): Gunfire at the public threshold killed one and injured six. Outer-ring control is part of campus safety. [15]
• South Carolina State University, Orangeburg (Oct. 4, 2025): Homecoming-period shootings left one dead and another injured. Dorms and campus precincts function like small venues with complex access. [16]
• Downtown Montgomery, AL (Oct. 4, 2025): Two groups exchanged fire in a post-game crowd, killing two and injuring twelve. Open-air gatherings need deterrence and managed egress, not just presence. [17]

Quick Checklist

1. Control rooftops and windows with signed access control and posted posts. [2][3]
2. Use staging and backdrops to deny long lines of fire, and pre-plan egress. [8][5]
3. Drill a single incident command net and a cordon–forensics handoff. [3][4]

Final thought

You can keep the event welcoming while quietly reducing attacker advantage. Design the site to disrupt sightlines, train people to move crowds, and practice the first hour. The same choices that make attack paths harder also make medical care faster and evidence cleaner after the fact. That is how you harden a venue without killing the event. [2][3][4][5]

References (endnotes)

[1] LCG, “After Utah — Risk-Management Playbook” series outline, Part 4 topics. (Internal, cited for series continuity.)
[2] U.S. DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events. PDF: https://portal.cops.usdoj.gov/resourcecenter/RIC/Publications/cops-w0703-pub.pdf
[3] Bureau of Justice Assistance, Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement (2018). PDF: https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/Planning_Primer_508c.pdf
[4] CISA, Venue Guide for Security Enhancements (resource catalog). https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/venue-guide-security-enhancements
[5] NFPA, “Strategies for Crowd Management Safety.” https://www.nfpa.org/news-blogs-and-articles/blogs/2022/11/01/strategies-for-crowd-management-safety
[6] NASFM, Crowd Manager Training (NFPA 101, NFPA 1, IFC alignment). https://www.firemarshals.org/Crowd-Manager-Training
[7] Event Safety Alliance, Standards & Guidance. https://eventsafetyalliance.org/standards-guidance
[8] FEMA Risk Management Series, Design Guidance for Shelters and Safe Rooms (FEMA 453) and Risk Assessment (FEMA 452). PDFs: https://www.fema.gov/pdf/plan/prevent/rms/453/fema453.pdf, https://www.fema.gov/pdf/plan/prevent/rms/452/fema452_step1.pdf
[9] National Archives, Warren Commission Report, Chapter 8: The Protection of the President (1964). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-8.html
[10] ASIS International, Executive Protection Standard (overview). https://www.asisonline.org/security-news/standards-guidelines/executive-protection-standard/
[11] Reuters, “Slovak government meets following assassination attempt on PM Robert Fico” (May 16, 2024). https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/slovak-government-meet-following-assasination-attempt-pm-2024-05-16/
[12] FEMA, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201 (THIRA/SPR), 3rd Ed. PDF: https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/CPG201Final20180525.pdf
[13] FBI Detroit, “Update on Shooting and Fire at Grand Blanc LDS Church” (Sept. 28, 2025), and ABC News coverage. https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/detroit/news/fbi-detroit-update-on-shooting-and-fire-at-grand-blanc-lds-church, https://abcnews.go.com/US/investigators-probe-motive-michigan-church-shooting-fire/story?id=126030281
[14] City of Minneapolis, “Shooting on August 27, 2025: Updated Information,” and Minnesota Reformer reporting. https://www.minneapolismn.gov/resident-services/public-safety/city-emergency/shooting-august-27/, https://minnesotareformer.com/2025/08/27/thousands-of-minnesotans-mourn-the-death-of-two-children-after-annunciation-church-shooting/
[15] MPR News, “One dead, six hurt after shooting outside Cristo Rey Jesuit High School,” and KARE 11 update. https://www.mprnews.org/story/2025/08/26/minneapolis-shooting-one-dead-six-hurt, https://www.kare11.com/article/news/local/prosecutors-accomplices-charged-in-deadly-minneapolis-shooting-gunman-still-on-the-loose-quinn/89-b8e36cde-5463-489b-9777-dfbed57b6b75
[16] People, “At least 1 dead as 2 separate shootings at S.C. State University” (Oct. 4–5, 2025). https://people.com/shootings-at-scsu-homecoming-campus-on-lockdown-11824538
[17] Associated Press and People, “Arrest made after Montgomery mass shooting; 2 dead, 12 injured” (Oct. 4–10, 2025). https://apnews.com/article/e8ebfbbc052644b7fa601d81a56911fa, https://people.com/2-people-killed-multiple-others-injured-mass-shooting-alabama-11824522

This article is for general information and does not constitute legal advice.